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Constitutions and Capabilities: A (Necessarily) Pragmatic
Approach
Diane P. Wood*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Nussbaum has thrown down the gauntlet in her Foreword:' do
countries have a moral obligation to develop and abide by constitutional
principles that will lead to the full development of all human beings? Or is it
either necessary or appropriate to take a more laissez-faire approach to the
nurturing of human potential, perhaps because of the risk that governments
might be too intrusive, or because of a concern about diverting enough
resources from private control to governmental control to get the job done?
There is a great deal to admire in Professor Nussbaum's Capabilities
Approach (CA). Human beings are fundamentally social creatures. Before it is
anything else, human history is the tale of groups of people and how they have
chosen to live together and to interact with other groups. As the Foreword
notes, the Founders of the United States drew on a rich intellectual history when
they wrote the federal Constitution.2 Someone reading the Constitution for the
first time, however, is not likely to think immediately of the CA. That suggests
two questions: First, is Professor Nussbaum right when she argues that a
society's constitution ought to include provisions designed to develop human
capabilities? And second, even if this is a worthy goal, is there anything useful
that judges can or should do to further that goal?
* Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer in Law, The
University of Chicago.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Consjitutions and Capabiliies: 'Perception"Against Lofty Formalism, 121
Harv L Rev 4, 56-59 (Nov 2007).
2 Id at 40-41.
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II. CAPABILITIES AND THEIR PLACE IN LAW
A. Generally
It is helpful to begin with a quick review of the CA. In footnote 15 of the
Foreword, Professor Nussbaum sets out the specific capabilities that she has
identified (in the Foreword as well as in other work) as "necessary conditions of
a fife worthy of human dignity."3 Here is the list:
1. Life
2. Bodily Health
3. Bodily Integrity
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought
5. Emotions
6. Practical Reason
7. Affiliation (both with respect to associations with others and with
respect to one's personal dignity with worth equal to that of others)
8. Respect for Other Species
9. Play
10. Control over One's Environment
4
Law intersects with these capabilities in numerous ways-even more ways than
Professor Nussbaum identifies in the Foreword. At a very practical level, law
authorizes the employment of police, who must assure public safety and security
and restrain those who do not respect the rights and autonomy of others. It
protects freedoms to speak, to associate, and to choose and follow a religion. It
forces those who might pollute the environment to internalize the costs they are
imposing on all around them. It provides for mechanisms through which things
like health care and education are delivered.
But law is capable of doing more than this. One can see a glimpse of that
potential in the two great international covenants on human rights: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the
United States is one of 165 states parties,5 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which the United States is
Id at 15 n 15; see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disabilio, Nationality, Species
Membership 76-78 (Harvard 2006); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The
Capabiliies Approach 78-80 (Cambridge 2000).
4 Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 15 n 15 (cited in note 1).
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") , 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (Dec 16,
1966, entered into force Mar 23, 1976); UN, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited With The Secretary
General International Covenant on Civil and Political R'gbts, online at http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=lV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (visited Nov 21,
2009).
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not among the 160 states parties.6 The two covenants entered into force in
1976.7 They are expressly designed to operate together (in spite of the fact that
nations may subscribe to one but not the other, as the United States has). Thus,
the third paragraph of the ICCPR recognizes "that, in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying
civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights."8 The ICESCR says
exactly the same thing, just reversing the final two phrases.9
The ICCPR calls on states parties to refrain from discriminating on a
variety of grounds, including "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status."' It
specifically requires states to ensure equality between men and women;" it
guarantees a right to life; 12 it prohibits slavery of all kinds; 3 it assures the right to
"liberty and security of person" and a variety of criminal procedure rights; 4 it
assures liberty of movement; 5 it forbids arbitrary or unlawful interference with
"privacy, family, or correspondence" and "unlawful attacks on . . . honor and
reputation"; 16 and it provides for "freedom of thought, conscience and religion,"
and the right to marry and found a family.'" In short, the ICCPR spells out in
even more detail than the Bill of Rights in the US Constitution a comprehensive
set of civil rights. Most, if not all, of the rights recognized in the ICCPR are
negative in character, which is to say that they describe areas into which
government may not intrude, or actions that government may not take.
6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), 993 UN Treaty Ser
3 (Dec 16, 1966, entered into force Jan 3, 1976); UN, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deoosited With
The Secretagy General International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, online at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang=en (visited Nov 21, 2009).
7 ICCPR, 999 UN Treaty Ser 171 (cited in note 5), ICESCR, 993 UN Treaty Set 3 (cited in note 6).
8 ICCPR, Preamble, 3 (cited in note 5).
9 ICESCR, Preamble, 3 (cited in note 6).
10 ICCPR, Art 2.1 (cited in note 5).
I1 I d at Art 3.
12 Id at Art 6.
13 Id at Art 8.
14 ICCPR, Arts 9, 10, 14, 15 (cited in note 5).
15 Id atArt 12.
16 Id at Art 17.
17 Id at Arts 18, 23.
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The ICESCR, in contrast, picks up the theme of affirmative rights-areas
in which governments must act. Many of its provisions look as if they came
straight out of Professor Nussbaum's CA. The ICESCR recognizes that states
(particularly developing countries) may not have the resources to achieve full
compliance with its terms immediately, but it requires each state "to take
steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in" the Covenant.'8
Thus, the ICESCR recognizes not only the right to work, but also the right to
"technical and vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and
techniques."' 9 Not only that, but it requires states to ensure fair wages, equal pay
for equal work, the ability to earn "[a] decent living for [workers] and their
families," safe and healthy working conditions, equal chances for promotion,
and adequate rest and limitation of working hours.20 The ICESCR also
recognizes "the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.'
Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 are especially notable in their congruence with the
CA.22 Article 11 acknowledges "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and
housing. ' 23 Article 12 recognizes "the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 2 4 Articles 13 and 14
address the right to education.25 Article 13.1 flatly says, "The States Parties to
the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree
that education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 26 The ICESCR calls for free and
compulsory primary education and the progressive introduction of free
secondary education "in its different forms, including technical and vocational"
education. 27 Finally, it recognizes the right of all persons to participate in cultural
life. 2
8
18 ICESCR, Art 2.1 (cited in note 6).
19 Id at Art 6.
20 Id at Art 7.
21 Id at Art 9.
22 ICESCR, Arts 11-14 (cited in note 6).
23 Id at Art 11.
24 Id at Art 12.
25 Id at Arts 13-14.
26 ICESCR, Art 13.1 (cited in note 6).
27 Id at Art 13.2(a)-(b).
28 Id atArt 15.1(a).
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The US Constitution recognizes treaties, along with the Constitution and
the laws of the United States, as part of the "supreme Law of the Land."29
Before turning directly to the Constitution, it is therefore fair to ask what impact
the ICCPR has on US law, given the fact that the United States is a party to that
Covenant. The answer is more complex than one might imagine. As Professor
Louis Henkin has pointed out, the United States has regularly attached to its
ratifications of the major human rights treaties "a 'package' of reservations,
understandings and declarations (RUDs),, 30 designed to ensure that the treaty in
question will not be understood as creating individually enforceable rights and to
underscore the Senate's understanding that the treaty does not require any
changes to existing US law.
A set of RUDs to this effect was appended to the Senate's consent to
ratification of the ICCPR.31 It is noteworthy that Section II, Paragraph 5 of the
RUDs explicitly States that thc power to implement the ICCPR lies primarily in
the hands of the federal government; that is to say, the Covenant is not self-
executing and does not create any new domestic rights of its own force.32 By so
providing, the Senate ensured that no possible argument could be made under
Missouri v Holland,33 to the effect that the treaty conferred rights that went
beyond those that Congress could have embodied in legislation, and it also gave
notice that the United States did not regard its adherence to the Covenant as
requiring any changes in existing US law or practice.
The ICCPR remains important for US law insofar as one is talking about
congressional action and executive branch policy. But, as a result of the RUDs, it
cannot be invoked directly in court as a source of rights. Afortiori, the ICESCR
does not have the force of law in the United States, because the United States is
not a party to that Covenant. The net result is that neither treaty provides a solid
basis for someone seeking to find legal support for the CA in US law. For that, it
is necessary to turn directly to domestic law and to see whether, or to what
extent, there is a basis from which one could develop a more self-conscious CA.
29 US Const, Art VI, 2.
30 Louis Henkin, U.S. Ralification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am J Ind
L 341, 341 (1995).
31 US Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Ex Cal 17, 102d Cong 2d Sess in 138 Cong Rec S 4781 (Apr 2, 1992)
(Listing the reservations, declarations, and understanding to accompany US ratification of the
ICCPR).
32 Id; see also Buell v Mitchell, 274 F3d 337, 372 (6th Cir 2001) (recognizing that the ICCPR is not
self-executing and citing other cases to the same effect).
33 252 US 416, 432-33 (1920) (holding the constitutional limitations on the legislative power of the
federal government do not apply when the national government ratifies a self-executing treaty).
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B. Constitutional Recognition
As Professor Nussbaum notes, many countries with more recently written
constitutions, including places like India and South Africa, have included in their
constitutions provisions that explicitly adopt or reflect the CA.3 4 (Many of these
countries wrote their constitutions well after the entry into force of the ICCPR
and the ICESCR; it is thus not surprising to see the principles of the covenants
reflected in them.)3 s These constitutions guarantee such benefits as access to
health care, adequate housing, and a basic education to all persons in the
country.36
Provisions addressing these topics are not unknown in the United States,
but they do not appear at the federal constitutional level. State constitutions, to a
degree, are a different matter. Because, under the original constitutional design,
the states retained sovereignty over everything that was not delegated to the
federal government, the states were (and in some ways still are) the governing
entities of last resort in the United States. States remain responsible for some of
the most fundamental government tasks, such as the creation of relationships
between people (marriage, adoption, inheritance), education, the definition and
enforcement of property rights, and the law of contract. While federal criminal
law exists and is growing, the states remain the primary actors in the criminal
arena.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide details about all of those
fields, but since education figures so centrally in the CA, a look at the education
provisions in several state constitutions helps to illustrate the potential
importance of the states for someone committed to the CA. Some state
constitutions firmly establish a right to an education. Thus, the constitution of
Arizona states, "The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the
establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school
system."3 The constitution of Massachusetts goes on at rather flowery length
about the importance of education:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the
body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages
34 Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 67 (cited in note 1).
35 See, for example, India Const, Art 38 (enacted in 1978 and providing for the promotion of "the
welfare of the people by securing and protecting ... a social order in which justice, social,
economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life"); South Africa Const,
Arts 26-27, 29 (enacted in 1996 and providing a right to basic education, adequate housing, and
access to health care services).
36 India Const, Arts 21A, 38; South Africa Const, Arts 26-27, 29.
37 Ariz Const, Art XI, 1.
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of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different
orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all
future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature
and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at
Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage
private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the
promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures,
and a natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the
principles of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity,
industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity,
good humor, and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the
people. 38
Kentucky takes a more terse approach; its constitution says only, "The General
Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of
common schools throughout the State."39 And the constitution of Alabama,
while acknowledging the policy of thc state "to foster and promote the
education of its citizens in a manner and extent consistent with its available
resources," cautions that nothing in the constitution should be understood as
creating any right to an education or training at public expense.4" Illinois's
constitution proclaims that "[a] fundamental goal of the People of the State is
the educational development of all persons to the limits of their capacities," and
it requires the state to provide for "an efficient system of high quality public
educational institutions and services," that is free through the secondary level.41
It appears, therefore, that many if not most of the states are already convinced
of the central importance of education to a fully functioning community.
Matters are different at the federal level, although part of the reason for
this has to do with the kind of federal structure the Framers of the Constitution
chose to adopt. As is well known, the 1787 text of the Constitution was devoted
almost entirely to the machinery of government. James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton, in the essays that were later published as The Federalist Papers, argued
that a properly organized government will deliver justice to all, will contain
within itself all that is necessary to defeat factionalism, and basic rights will be
protected by legislatures.42 The people of the several states, however, were
unwilling to place all their trust in this indirect protection of basic rights, and so
they insisted that a Bill of Rights be added to the Constitution-as it was, in
38 Mass Const, Pt 2, Ch V, § 2.
39 Ky Const, § 183.
40 Ala Const, Amend 111, § 256.
41 11 Const, Art X, § 1.
42 The Honorable Diane P. Wood, Madison Lecture: Our 18th Century Constitution in the 21st Centuy
World, 80 NYU L Rev 1079, 1087-1088 (2005) (arguing, among other things, that the Framers did
not intend for the Constitution to contain a complete list of protected individual rights).
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1791. The Bill of Rights addresses a few of the prerequisites to a CA, but, as
Professor Nussbaum's Foreword demonstrates, far from all." To the extent that
the US Constitution has made room for a CA at the constitutional level, it has
been through devices such as incorporation of many parts of the Bill of Rights
through Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment (thus ensuring, for example,
that the states, to the same degree as the federal government, are forbidden from
establishing a religion, or from imposing prior restraints on speech, or from
conducting unreasonable searches and seizures), or the doctrine of "substantive
due process," through which the law protects certain aspects of the dignity and
inviolability of the individual.44
Nevertheless, some clauses in the federal Constitution-though not as
many as Professor Nussbaum might prefer-might be seen as guides to the two
democratically elected branches of government, Congress and the President,
telling them what kind of legislation ought to be passed, and in what spirit that
legislation ought to be enforced. The Preamble to the Constitution can be read
as just that kind of instruction. Its familiar language announces that the
Constitution is being created in order (among other things) to "promote the
general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."4 These purposes presumably inform the understanding of all that
follows. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, known as the Necessary and Proper
Clause, gives Congress the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States."46
Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, the Titles of Nobility Clause, forbids all such
distinctions among people.47 It can fairly be seen as an early expression of the
equality principle. Finally, Article V1, Paragraph 3, anticipates the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment in its command that "no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States."" Clauses like these, including the Republican Form of
Government clause of Article IV, Section 4, have not typically been recognized
as giving rise to individual rights enforceable in courts. 49 But it would be a great
fallacy to think that a part of the Constitution that is addressed to the Legislative
or Executive Branch is somehow unimportant. The contrary is true. Indeed, for
43 See Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 56-59 (cited in note 1).
44 US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
45 Id at Preamble.
46 Id at Art I, § 8, Clause 18.
47 Id at Art I, § 9, Clause 8.
48 US Const, Art VI, 3.
49 Id at Art V, § 4.
Vol. 10 No. 2
Constitutions and Capabilities
someone committed to the CA, these clauses may be just as important (if not
more so) than the more conventional judicially enforceable constitutional rules.
III. THE CA AS AN INTERPRETATIVE GUIDE
As one comes closer to a strong version of the CA that could actually be
enforced in domestic courts by individual litigants (as is the case in some other
countries around the world), it becomes more difficult to imagine how one
might implement Professor Nussbaum's ideas. Before turning to domestic
applications, it is worth noting that the position of international courts like the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is different. The ICJ hears only cases
between states, and Article 38 of the court's Statute explicitly recognizes
international conventions as a source of law. 0 But a decision of the ICJ
interpreting either the ICCPR or the ICESCR would be binding on a particular
country only if it had consented to the court's jurisdiction, and the United States
has not done so for disputes relating to the ICCPR. In parts of her Foreword,
however, Professor Nussbaum points the way to an intriguing possibility: that is,
using the CA as a canon of constitutional and statutory interpretation.5'
A. The Charming Betsy
Returning to the topic of domestic US law, there are some useful analogies
to be drawn between the CA and other areas the courts have encountered. In
many ways, the CA calls to mind a very old Supreme Court decision known as
Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy 52 where the Court addressed the similarly knotty
question of how customary international law is to be treated in US courts. Its
conclusion in Charming Bety is now practically Holy Writ among international
lawyers: "[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains."53 Substitute "the capabilities
approach" for "the law of nations," and one would have something close to
what Professor Nussbaum's Foreword advocates.
In some ways, the CA is quite similar to customary international law. The
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations,
in discussing the sources of international law, begins with the statement that "[a]
rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the
50 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art 38(1)(a), 59 Stat 1055, Treaty Serial No 993
(1945).
51 See Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 56-60 (cited in note 1).
52 6 US (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (stating that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains").
53 Id at 118.
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international community of states (a) in the form of customary law."54 It then
describes "customary international law" as law that "results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."55 This is plainly a far cry from a statute that one can find in black
and white in a book, or a provision of a written constitution, although it has
some kinship with the common law. Because it is more difficult to ascertain the
precise content of customary international law, and there are times when it
seems to be honored in the breach, some people are not sure if it ought to be
called "law" at all. Others, including the authors of the Restatement (Third), take
the position that there is indeed a difference between the rules of customary
international law and day-to-day government policy. 56
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to take and defend a position on
this longstanding debate. Rather, it is enough to point out that the CA's position
in the legal order is similarly difficult to pinpoint: is there really a legally
enforceable right to an education? Do people really have a right to state-
supported development of their capabilities? What happens if the state falls
down on the job? A presumption like that of the Charming Bety works only if it is
fair to assume that this is the tiebreaker that Congress (or any other legislature)
wants-that is, to comply with customary international law, or to advance the
CA. Although it is difficult to point to concrete evidence showing that Congress
is committed to a CA approach, it may be even more difficult to support the
position that Congress is hostile to it. If, therefore, in case of doubt a court is
compelled to make one or the other assumption (that is, should the law be read
in a way consistent with the CA, or inconsistent with it) sources from the
Preamble to the Constitution to the statements of purpose in statutes might, in
many contexts, support a default assumption that reflects the CA.
B. Context Versus Plain Meaning
Another way of looking at the CA is as a method of interpretation, rather
than some kind of canon. This is particularly useful if the case at hand requires
careful attention to the details of a person's condition, rather than the "lofty
formalism" that Professor Nussbaum condemns. None of the methods of
interpretation that are currently the subject of debate among the Justices on the
Supreme Court is a perfect fit for the CA, but some may be more compatible
with it than others. One school of thought is "originalism," which Justice Scalia
has advocated strongly; in his view, this is the only legitimate approach to
54 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(1)(a) (1987).
55 Id at 5 102(2).
56 Id at §§ 101-103.
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constitutional interpretation. While there are now several strands of originalism,
Justice Scalia's version favors strict adherence to the plain meaning of the words
in the Constitution, as they would have been understood at the time the relevant
section was written. 7 Thus, in District of Columbia v Heller,58 Justice Scalia's
opinion turns to eighteenth century dictionaries and to phrases elsewhere in the
Constitution in order to interpret the Second Amendment. 9 He also consults
other written documents of the founding period to see how the phrase "keep
arms" was used by the authors of the Amendment.60 What he did not find
relevant was the context of the right to bear arms in the modern world, or the
reasons why the people of the District of Columbia might have been concerned
about gun violence, or even Mr. Heller's need for a gun.
Justice Breyer, in a number of debates with Justice Scalia, has urged a
different kind of contextual approach-one in which courts defer to the
judg-ments of the democratically elected branches of government unless there is
reason to fear the kind of tyranny of the majority that Madison decried.6"
Although there is no guarantee that this "active liberty" approach, as Justice
Breyer calls it, will coincide perfectly with the CA, in practice there appears to be
significant overlap. By focusing on factors like congressional intent, the purpose
of a law, the problem that the law was designed to address, and the question
whether the law as applied in the particular case will further or frustrate those
purposes, someone following Justice Breyer's approach will acquire a rich
understanding of the human dimensions of the case before the court. The law
itself does not change, of course, but the factual matrix to which the law is
applied is likely to be more complex. Professor Nussbaum predicts that greater
nuance will be fostered by a deeper understanding of the facts, and that this in
turn is likely to produce decisions that are relatively more consistent with the CA
than decisions that restrict the range of relevant information to the "plain
meaning" or "original intent" of the law. 62
Consider Justice Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 31 HarvJ L & Pub Pol 871 (2008) (summarizing Justice
Scalia's view of originalism); see also Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism
Debate, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol 875, 883 (2008) (providing an introduction to the debate over
originalism and some of the varying strands).
58 128 S Ct 2783 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear
arms for self-defense).
59 Id at 2791-94.
60 Id at 2791-92.
61 A Conversation on the Constitution: Perspectives from Active Libery and A Matter of lnterpretation, American
Constitution Society debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer (Dec 5 2006), online at
http://www.acslaw.org/node/3909 (visited Nov 21, 2009).
62 Nussbaum, 121 Harv L Rev at 78-79 (cited in note 1).
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The Court is split, as Professor Nussbaum's Foreword shows, between
Justices who think it important first to look at the entire background and
purpose of a statute or constitutional provision and then to ask how it ought to
apply to the particular person before it, on the one hand, and those who favor a
more formalistic approach, on the other.63 Those who are attracted to the image
of Lady Justice with the blindfold on her eyes will tend to favor the Scalia
approach-individual differences do not and cannot matter, else overall justice
will not be done. Those who prefer Portia as their model and want their justice
tempered with mercy and tailored to the particulars of a case are likely to try
harder to understand the purpose of the law and how it will affect those to
whom it applies. To the extent that the law is flexible enough to permit this
inquiry, the outcomes are more likely to be consistent with the CA.
IV. THE CA AS A SOURCE OF INDIVIDUALLY ENFORCEABLE
RIGHTS
The most difficult application of the CA for courts in the United States-
or, more starkly put, the least likely application-is as a source of individual
rights that can be directly enforced in a court. 64 Here it is important to recall the
various elements of the CA that Professor Nussbaum has described. A recent
example from the Seventh Circuit shows how difficult it would be to introduce
CA-based rights directly into American jurisprudence. The case was called
Sandage v Board of Commissioners of Vanderburgh Couny.6" The plaintiffs were
relatives of three people who had been murdered by a man named Moore while
Moore was on work-release from a four-year prison sentence he was serving for
robbery.66 One of the victims, Sheena Sandage-Shofner, had contacted the
63 Id at 82.
64 It is worth noting that courts in countries whose constitutions reflect the principles of both the
ICCPR and the ICESCR, and which are parties to both Covenants, may be less constrained in this
respect. Article 2 of the new Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, adopted in late 2008, offers
individuals within the jurisdiction of a State party a new avenue to seek enforcement of the rights
enshrined in the ICESCR. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, Resolution A/RES/63/117, UN General Assembly, 63d Sess (Dec 10, 2008), UN
Doc A/RES/63/117. Consider Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights
to Food, Water, Housing and Health?, 98 Am J Ind L 462 (2004). As Dennis and Stewart point out, it
is very difficult to draft provisions that at the same time confer individually enforceable rights and
yet take a realistic approach to the ability of any given State to find the resources to comply with
those rights.
65 548 F3d 595 (7th Cir 2008) (noting that as "the Constitution is a charter of negative liberties,"
there is no federal constitutional right to be protected against private violence that the
government is not complicit in).
66 Id at 596.
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sheriff's department twice to complain that Moore was harassing her, but the
authorities failed to respond until it was too late.6" The plaintiffs' effort to hold
the sheriff responsible did not succeed.68 Some of the language in Judge Richard
Posner's opinion for the court throws light on the difficulties that one would
encounter in trying to implement the CA in this most immediate way:
We assume, given the procedural posture, that the defendants were reckless
in failing to act on the complaint of harassment .... There is no federal
constitutional right to be protected by the government against private
violence in which the government is not complicit. So the Supreme Court
held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
[1989] .... In Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) ... we had
said that while "there is a constitutional right not to be murdered by a state
officer, for the state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when its officer,
acting under color of state law, deprives a person of life without due process
of law, ... there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state
against being murdered by criminals or madmen .... The Constitution is a
charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not
require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so
elementary a service as maintaining law and order." ... There is a moral
right to such services-protection against violence is the single most
important function of government-and a government that fails in this duty
invites well-deserved political retribution. But there is no enforceable federal
constitutional right.
Such a right would be impractical. The federal courts would have to decide
how much money each state and every local community would be required
to allocate to protection of life, limb, and property. They would have to
decide how much money must be appropriated for police and prosecutors
and prisons, how police resources should be deployed across
neighborhoods, the minimum length of state prison sentences, when if ever
probation or parole should be substituted for imprisonment or a prison
sentence suspended, and which state prisoners should be allowed to serve
part or all of their sentences in halfway houses, at home, or on work release.
The federal courts would fix the speed limits on state highways, prescribe
the lighting on state streets, regulate fire departments, public hospitals, and
paramedic services. 69
The DeShaney case to which Judge Posner alluded had equally horrifying facts.
There, child welfare workers repeatedly visited the home of little Joshua
67 Id.
68 Id at 600.
69 Sandage, 548 F3d at 596.
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DeShaney, observed that he was being abused by his father, and did nothing.7 °
The father eventually beat Joshua so severely that he suffered permanent brain
damage and was rendered profoundly retarded.7 When the family sued,
however, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the family failed to
state a legal claim against the county department of social services. Once again,
indifference-even reckless indifference-on the part of the county was not
something that the law reached. 2
These two cases may well have come out the other way, if the CA were a
judicially enforceable part of US law. But the concerns that Judge Posner raised
are not fanciful. Judges are ill-equipped to decide whether a sheriff's department
should immediately dispatch a deputy after a call, or if a wait-and-see approach is
acceptable; or to decide on funding levels for social service departments; or to
decide whether a 25-to-1 student-to-teacher ratio is low enough to permit
effective learning.
Before the CA could be adopted in this final robust form, it would be
necessary to find principled ways in which to draw these kinds of lines. Ideally,
those lines would be drawn by the legislature, in implementing legislation.
Without such an anchor, judges would be hard-pressed to explain the sources of
law on which they were relying. Although it may be tempting to draw the line
between public liability and non-liability based on the severity of the harm to
which the inaction led (death in Sandage, profound mental retardation in
DeShany), there is a troublesome ex post quality to such a rule. Another
possibility might be to draw sharp lines between individual liability and
government liability, but it is worth noting that both DeShany and Sandage were
primarily against institutions rather than individual officers. One might look at
the right that the state is failing to deliver-health care is a good example for the
millions of uninsured people in the United States-and ask what kind of remedy
a judge could give that might change things for them.
I confess that I find it difficult to imagine how a federal court could
implement the most ambitious parts of the CA, other than by the more modest
interpretative conventions noted earlier. Judges in countries with specially
designated constitutional courts have also had more freedom to act, since the
70 DeShany v Winnebago Coun Department of Social Services, 489 US 189, 191-93 (1989) (holding that
"nothing in the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors").
71 Id at 193.
72 Id at 195-203.
Vol. 10 No. 2
Constitutions and Capabilities
citizens of those countries have openly opted for this degree of judicial review. 3
One technique that has worked elsewhere has been to understand CA-based
constitutional provisions as setting goals that must be realized progressively by
legislatures. This, after all, is the approach to which much of the international
community is committed, through its adherence to the ICESCR.
One can only hope that Professor Nussbaum will tackle this final problem
in her future scholarly work. There is much to admire in her explication of the
CA and how it relates to constitutions, not least the fact that she has made it
impossible to pretend that formal equality of position will automatically lead to
equality of outcomes, or to forget that (to borrow a phrase from a former
governor of Texas, Ann Richards) some people are born on third base and think
that they hit a triple. Our society can and should do better. The first step is to
identify what a full human existence requires, and then it is possible to begin
-new to work on ways to achieve ;t, through all of the institutions and legal
mechanisms available.
73 See, for example, South Africa Const, Ch 8, Art 167, 5 (stating that "[t]he Constitutional Court
makes the final decision whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the
President is constitutional").
Winter 2010
Wood

